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CONVERSE INSTRUCTIONS UNDER MAI
ELWOOD L. THOMAS*
I.

THE FUNCTION OF THE CONVERSE INSTRUCTION

To anyone who has a general working knowledge of any jury instruction system in which the jury returns a general verdict, the function of the
verdict director is obvious. It is the key instruction which specifies those
elements which the jury must find in order to return a verdict for the
plaintiff. Likewise, the functions of most other instructions such as cautionary instructions, the burden of proof instruction, the damage instruction,
and the form of verdict are fairly obvious. All of these instructions are
ancillary to the verdict director, but each performs a necessary function in
guiding the jury through its deliberations to a verdict.
Unlike these instructions, the function of a converse instruction is not
so obvious, and it is certainly not essential in the package of instructions
which goes to the jury. If the verdict director says, "Your verdict must be
for plaintiff if you believe plaintiff sustained damage," what does it add to
the jury's understanding to further instruct that "Your verdict must be for
defendant unless you believe plaintiff sustained damage"?' The true conHenry S. Geyer Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia; A.B.
1954, Simpson College; J.D. "1957, Drake University. The author has served as a
member of the Missouri Supreme Court Committee on Jury Instructions since
January, 1976, and as Reporter of the Committee since December, 1976. The views
expressed in this article are those of the author and carry neither the approval nor
the demurrer of the MAI Committee.
1. It is argued by some that without a converse instruction, there is really no
specific direction anywhere in the instructions telling the jury that if plaintiff does
not carry his burden of proof, defendant wins. MAI No. 3.01, the primary burden
of proof instruction, states, "If the evidence in the case does not cause you to believe
a particular proposition submitted or if you are unable to form a belief as to any
such proposition, then you cannot return a verdict requiring belief of that proposition." It is true that when coupled with the verdict director, this tells the jury that
plaintiff cannot win unless he carries his burden of proof but does not tell the jury
that in such event, defendant wins. It is possible that defendants would be more
willing to forego the use of a converse instruction if MAI No. 3.01 were changed to
make it clearer that defendant wins if the plaintiff fails to meet his burden of proof.
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verse instruction incorporates and thereby points to one or more elements
of the verdict director and reiterates the obvious result of the plaintiff
failing to prove one or more of the elements of his verdict director. Thus, it
is obvious that the court could send a complete and logical set of instructions to the jury without including a converse instruction. In this respect,
converse instructions are "excess baggage" in the package of instructions
which goes to the jury.2 The MAI' system acknowledges this fact by making
the use of converse instructions optional with the defendant.
For an instruction that is nonessential, defendants have jealously protected their right to use a converse of the plaintiff's verdict directing4
instruction, and it is clear that they are entitled to such an instruction.
Under MAI, the instructions make a heavy impact on the nature of the
closing argument. This is true because the general approach of MAI is to
submit only ultimate issues of fact. Thus, the instructions form only a
skeleton of the law of the case, and it is left to the lawyers in closing
argument to expand and flesh out the law applicable to the case. The
plaintiff will inevitably emphasize to the jury his verdict director which
begins, "Your verdict must be for plaintiff if you believe: (the various
elements of plaintiff's case)." Since the instructions come from the judge
who stands apart from the lawyers' obvious role as advocates, the instruction in which the judge tells the jury the circumstances under which they
must find for the plaintiff takes on special significance. It is understandable
that defendants have viewed it as very important that they also have an
instruction in which the judge states, "Your verdict must be for defendant
Despite this understandable desire for an instruction which speaks
specifically of a defendant's verdict, many well respected defense lawyers
elect not to use converse instructions. If the defendant's major contention
is that the plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of proof on each of the
various elements of his case, this argument can be presented to the jury
very effectively by arguing from the plaintiff's verdict director. On the
other hand, if the defendant relies primarily on the failure of plaintiff's
evidence on one particular element of his case, then a converse instruction
can be used effectively to highlight this element. For example, if the
defendant contends that the plaintiff is a malingerer, then a converse
instruction which converses damages can be very helpful in marshalling the
language of the judge behind the defendant's contention that plaintiff was
not really injured.
The MAI rules for the use of converse instructions are unbelievably
technical. This is caused in part because these rules have developed largely
2. How To Use This Book, "Converse Instructions," MAI p. LI.
3. MISSOURI APPROVED JURY INSTRUCTIONS (2d ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited
as MAI].
4. Frazier v. Ford Motor Company, 365 Mo. 62,276 S.W.2d 95 (Mo. En Banc
1955). See discussion at MAI No. 33.01.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol42/iss2/1
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on a case by case basis. The insistence of defendants upon making the
maximum use of converse instructions has produced a continually evolving
and changing series of guidelines for the use of converse instructions. The
efforts of the Supreme Court Committee on Jury Instructions 5 and the
court to give the defendant his converse instruction without upsetting the
desired balance by allowing him to use too many converse instructions have
resulted in an almost unintelligible series of rules about how many converse
instructions a defendant may use.' The option of the defendant to converse as much or as little of the verdict director as he wishes has produced
case decisions which may entrap both the wary and the unwary.7 It is the
purpose of this article to pull together the procedures and rules in the use
of converse instructions which have developed in the twelve years under
MAI. To some extent, this article will tell the reader how to use converse
instructions. Of equal or greater importance is the hope that the reader will
develop a sense for recognizing those cases in which the use of a converse
instruction should be avoided. The adage that "discretion is the better part
of valor" is a ringing truth when it comes to preparing jury instructions,
and with respect to converse instructions, discretion often calls for no
instruction at all. Finally, it is possible that this compilation of the intricacies
of the use of converse instructions will serve as the catalyst for the bench
and bar to reconsider whether converse instructions really merit inclusion
in the MAI system.
II.

FOUR TYPES OF CONVERSE INSTRUCTIONS UNDER MAI

MAI provides for four different types of converse instructions. These
are:
1. "If you do not believe" introduction:'
Your verdict must be for defendant if you do not believe (some or all
of the propositions submitted in plaintiff's
verdict director).
9
2. "Unless you believe" introduction:

Your verdict must be for defendant unless you believe (some or all
of the propositions submitted in plaintiff's verdict director).
3. Affirmative converse: 10
Your verdict must be for defendant if you believe (some ultimate
issue which, if true, would
defeat plaintiff's claim).
11
4. General converse:
Your verdict must be for defendant (unless you believe) (if you do

5. The Supreme Court Commettee on Jury Instructions, which is appointed
by Order of the Supreme Court of Missouri, formulates Instructions, Notes on Use
and Committee Comments. These are submitted to the court and become part of
the MAI after approval and adoption by the court.
6. See text accompanying notes 54 through 71 infra.
7. See text accompanying notes 40 through 48 infra.
8. MAI No. 33.02.
9. MAI No. 33.03 and 33.04.
10. MAI No. 33.05.
11. MAI No. 33.13.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1977
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not believe) each proposition submitted to you in Instruction

Number - (here insert number of plaintiff's verdict directing
instruction).
The "if you do not believe" form and the "unless you believe" form are the
true converse instruction forms in that one of these phrases is combined
with language from the verdict director to instruct the jury that if the
plaintiff's evidence fails on the elements so specified, the verdict must be
for the defendant. Since the true converse instruction is used in the vast
majority of cases, this article will consider first the principles and problems
involved in the use of this format. The general converse and the affirmative converse will be discussed in subsequent sections.
III.

PREPARING THE TRUE CONVERSE INSTRUCTION

A.

Combine the AppropriatePreliminaryPhrase with
Languagefrom the Verdict Director

MAI is designed as a system of mandatory rather than optional instructions. This result is mandated by rule 70.01(b) 12 which states that if a
MAI instruction is applicable to the case being tried, such instruction must
be used. Thus, it is understandable that in drawing instructions most
lawyers first look to MAI to see if it contains an instruction usable in their
case. If it does, it is used in the form shown. Thus, it is natural to think of
MAI as a form book of the highest order.
Having developed this procedure for drawing instructions, it is not
surprising that many lawyers called upon to draw a converse instruction
follow the same procedure by turning to chapter 33 of MAI and selecting
what appears to be an appropriate converse instruction. It is the writer's
view that this is the wrong approach to use in drawing converse instructions. Unlike the other portions of MAI, the converse instructions set forth
chapter 33 are not mandatory instructions but should be thought of as
examples of the manner in which the appropriate introductory phrase can
be combined with language of the verdict director being conversed. Once
the appropriate introductory phrase has been selected ("if you do not
believe" or "unless you believe"), the only form from which to select
language for the rest of the converse instruction is the verdict director
itself. This approach is dictated by the General Comment on converse

instructions found at MAI No. 33.01 which requires that the appropriate
introductory phrase be "followed by one or more propositions submitted
by the verdict directing instruction and in 3substantially the same language
used in the verdict directing instruction."'
The use of the verdict director as the only form from which the
converse instruction should be drawn is not only mandated by the General
Comment but is also a surefire method of avoiding a whole series of
12. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 70.01(b).
13. See first sentence of the text under the heading "First Method" and under
the heading "Second Method," MAI, p. 349.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol42/iss2/1
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unrelated errors which can innocently arise in a converse instruction taken
directly from MAI rather than from the language of the verdict director
being conversed. For example, in Snyder v. Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific
Railroad,4 the' plaintiff submitted a FELA verdict director (MAI no.
24.01) which submits causation by stating:
Fifth, such negligence directly resulted in whole or in part in
injury to plaintiff.
To converse causation, the defendant selected MAI No. 33.03(5) which is a
converse instruction of causation as submitted in a regular negligence case.
This converse instruction reads:
Your verdict must be for defendant unless you believe defendant
was negligent and that plaintiff sustained damage as a direct result
thereof.
This converse instruction is erroneous for two reasons: first, it talks in
terms of damage instead of injury as submitted in the verdict director;
second, it omits the "in whole or in part" language.
In response to the defendant's argument that the instruction should be
approved since it was patterned after MAI No. 33.03(5), the court stated:
The test of the propriety of the second method converse instruction is not that it conforms to a given pattern, however extraneous, but that it is prefaced: unless you believe followed by one or
more propositions submitted by the verdict director and in substantially the same language used in the verdict director . .

.

.The

failure of defendant to comply with this mandatory requirement
15
was error.
The narrow holding of this case that it is erroneous to use a regular
negligence converse instruction against a FELA verdict director is noteworthy. However, the case is most important because it demonstrates that this
error would never have been made if the defendant had used the verdict
director as the form for thie converse instruction and used MAI merely as
an example rather than the source of the instruction.
There are many other examples of errors which can be avoided by
using the verdict director as the, source of language for the converse
instruction. For example, when the plaintiff submits on negligence per se,
the verdict director does not require a finding that the defendant's conduct
was negligent.' 6 It is reversible error for the defendant to converse this
verdict director with MAI No. 33.03(2) which is designed for conversing
negligence and which states, "Your verdict must be for defendant unless
you believe that defendant was negligent."'17 While the inappropriateness
of this converse instruction in this situation is obvious upon thoughtful
14. 521 S.W.2d 161 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1973).
15. Id. at 165.
16. See MAI No. 17.17 and 17.18.
17. Oventop v. Bi-State Development Agency, 521 S.W.2d 488 (Mo. App., D.
St. L. 1975).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1977
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consideration, it is understandable that a defendant could be led into this
error if he attempted to select an appropriate converse instruction from
those presented in the book. If the verdict director had been used as the
form for the converse, negligence would not be conversed because it is not
mentioned in the verdict director.
In at least two cases' s where the verdict director submitted failure to
use ordinary care (such as in MAI No. 22.03 - Invitee Injured), defendants have injected reversible error into a case by using an instruction from
MAI which converses negligence, a term which is not mentioned in an
ordinary care verdict director. Such an error could not occur in a converse
instruction drawn in the language of the verdict director.
The wrongful death verdict director 9 differs from a personal injury
verdict director 20 in that it submits the issue of whether the decedent died
rather than submitting the question of whether the plaintiff sustained
damage. The difference in the instructions reflects the fact that nominal
damages are presumed in a wrongful death case. If a defendant in a
wrongful death case uses an instruction from MAI which converses damages, 2 he will be in error because he is in violation of the rule that damages
are presumed in a wrongful death case.2 2 It is interesting to note that a
defendant who is in total ignorance of this presumption of nominal damages in a wrongful death case could nevertheless draw an accurate converse
instruction by simply using the verdict director as the form for the converse
instruction because the verdict director does not use the word "damages".
In Denny v. Mathieu23 the plaintiff submitted against the defendant
employer based upon the negligence of the employer's employee, a truck
driver. The defendant selected a converse instruction from MAI stating
that "Your verdict must be for defendant unless you believe defendant was
negligent." Since the defendant was the employer and was not even present
at the time of the accident, this converse instruction was erroneous. The
error resulted from referring to the defendant rather than to the employee
by name in the converse instruction. This is the kind of error which can
easily slip into a set of instructions through oversight. It is also the kind of
error which can easily be avoided by simply using the verdict director as the
source of the converse instruction since the verdict director will refer to the
negligence of the proper person.
18. Frogge v. Nyquist Plumbing & Ditching Co., 453 S.W.2d 913 (Mo. En
Banc 1970); Brewer v. Swift & Co., 451 S.W.2d 131 (Mo. En Banc 1970); But see

Demko v. H & H Inv. Co., 527 S.W.2d 382 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1975) (where

conversing negligence when the verdict director submitted failure to use ordinary
care was error but was not prejudicial because negligence in the converse instruc-

tion was defined as being the failure to use ordinary care.)
19. MAI No. 20.01.

20. MAI No. 17.01 and 17.02.
21. MAI No. 33.02(3), (4) or (5); MAI No. 33.03(3), (4) or (5); or MAI
33.04(2), (3 or (4).
22. Aubuchon v. LaPlant, 435 S.W.2d 648 (Mo. 1968).
23. 452 S.W.2d 114 (Mo. En Banc 1970).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol42/iss2/1
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Each of the mistakes demonstrated by the foregoing cases could slip by
the watchful eye of any lawyer under the pressure of trial. It is remarkable
that such diversity of error can be avoided by such a simple rule: Use the
verdict director to draw the converse. It will be a significant accomplishment if this article helps the reader realize that many errors can be successfully avoided by this simple procedure of using the verdict director as the
source of language for the converse instruction.
B.

Selecting the Appropriate Connecting Term

The various specifications and elements contained in the verdict directing instruction will be submitted either in the conjunctive (connected
with "and") or in the disjunctive (connected with "or") depending upon
which is required by the substantive law. If a defendant elects to converse
more than one specification or element of the verdict director, he is faced
with the problem of which connecting term (and vs. or) to use in the
converse instruction. The rule applied in this situation is that the same
connecting term as is used in the verdict director is always used in the
converse instruction. This rule is a specific application of the principle that
the converse instruction should be patterned after the verdict director. It
also reflects the fact that under the MAI system, the converse instruction is
a direct incorporation of the verdict director in that the converse tells the
jury that "Your verdict must be for defendant unless you believe (certain
elements of the verdict director)." If the connecting term were to be altered
in the converse instruction, then when the jury reads the converse as an
incorporation of the verdict director they may conclude that the verdict
director is disjunctive when in fact it is conjunctive or vice versa. So long as
the converse instruction is viewed as a direct reference to the verdict
director, it makes sense that the converse instruction should use the verdict
director language including the same connecting terms. Thus, in conversing a conjunctive submission from the verdict director, the defendant
should use the connecting term "and" in the converse instruction. In
conversing a disjunctive submission from the verdict director, the defendant should use the connecting term "or" in the converse instruction.
The application of this rule is fairly obvious in the case of the disjunctive submission. If the verdict director submits that "defendant either
failed to keep a careful lookout or drove at an excessive speed," the
converse instruction must state, "Your verdict must be for defendant
unless you believe defendant either failed to keep a careful lookout or
drove at an excessive speed." If the converse instruction requires the jury
to find for the defendant "unless you believe lookout and speed," this
would be error because the plaintiff is entitled to recover if the evidence
shows either specification; he is not required to prove both.
The rationale for the rule is not as obvious in the case of conjunctive
submissions. If the verdict director submits that the verdict must be for
plaintiff if the evidence shows that defendant was negligent and plaintiff
was thereby damaged, then the converse instruction would state that "Your
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1977
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verdict must be for defendant unless you believe defendant was negligent
and plaintiff was thereby damaged." Suppose the converse instruction
states "Your verdict must be for defendant unless you believe defendant
was negligent or plaintiff was thereby damaged." This is incorrect because
it is ambiguous. If the jury interprets this to say that "Your verdict must be
for defendant unless you believe defendant was negligent or unless you
believe plaintiff was thereby damaged" the instruction will be a correct
statement of the law and would be proper. However, if the jury reads the
converse instruction as a direct incorporation of the verdict director, then
they will read it to say that "Your verdict must be for defendant unless you
believe that defendant was negligent or that plaintiff was thereby damaged. '24 This latter interpretation is wrong because it does not conform to
the correct substantive law. However, it is not prejudicial because the error
favors the plaintiff and is detrimental to the defendant. Thus, if a defendant uses "or" in conversing a conjunctive submission, he is probably not
running any serious risk of reversal. But, he is giving an instruction which
is ambiguous and which may be read by the jury to ease the plaintiff's
burden of proving every element of his case.
Both the court and the committee have vacillated in applying this rule
when conversing conjunctive submissions. The indecision of the court is
illustrated by the following cases. In Young v. Grotsky25 the supreme court
approved a converse instruction in the disjunctive which conversed conjunctive submissions in the verdict director. The court suggested by way of
dicta that the converse instruction would have been improper if it had used
the conjunctive "and". In Wirs v. Bi-state Development Agency 26 the defendant correctly followed the rule in conversing a conjunctive submission. The
trial court granted the plaintiff's motion for new trial on the ground that
the converse instruction was confusing and misleading. The supreme court
reversed the trial court and approved the converse instruction, but the
reasoning is strained. The case is noteworthy because of the court's failure
to rely directly upon the basic rule that the converse instruction should use
the same connecting term as is used in the verdict director. The indecision
of the committee is demonstrated in Instruction Number 4 in the set of
24. The improper interpretation is present if the converse instruction is read
as it should be, as a direct reference to the plaintiff's verdict director and, in effect,
as an incorporation of the language of the verdict director. On the other hand, if
the converse instruction is read as somehow setting up certain propositions which, if
their disbelief is established, will allow the defendant to prevail, then conversing a
conjunctive submission with "or" in the converse instruction seems appropriate.
This dilemma as to how the converse instruction should be viewed is discussed in
the text accompanying notes 27 through 30 infra. The failure to recognize that the
converse instruction is a direct incorporation of the language of the verdict director
is the underlying problem both in selecting the correct connecting term and in
understanding the limitation on the use of the "if you do not believe" format when
conversing a disjunctive submission.
25. 459 S.W.2d 306 (Mo. 1970).
26. 484 S.W.2d 323 (Mo. En Banc 1972).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol42/iss2/1
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illustrative instructions at MAI No. 35.06 where "or" is used as a connecting term in conversing conjunctive elements of the plaintiff's verdict directing instruction. The confusion displayed by the court and the committee is
generated by the failure to consistently recognize that the converse instruction is designed to be a direct incorporation of the language of the verdict
director and, as such, it must use the exact language of the verdict director.
Failure to use the same connecting term in the converse instruction as
is used in the verdict director is clearly reversible error when conversing
disjunctive submissions. It appears to be the preferred but not the required
procedure for conversing conjunctive submissions. The MAI approach of
using the same connecting term in both the converse and verdict directing
instruction is dearly the better approach to the problem because it is a
simple mechanical method of achieving an accurate unambiguous statement of the law in the converse instruction. It manifests the general
proposition that the converse instruction is a direct incorporation of the
verdict director and that the language must be taken from the verdict
director itself.
C. Selecting the AppropriateIntroducto7y Phrase
("if you do not believe" vs. "unless you believe")
MAI provides for two types of true converse instructions. One uses the
introductory phrase "if you do not believe," and the other uses "unless you
believe." The "unless you believe" format is the universal instruction since
it can be used in conversing any type of verdict directing instruction.
instruction is prohibited
Under the MAI rules, the "if you do not believe"
27
when conversing a disjunctive submission.
Both the reason for providing more than one type of instruction as
well as the rationale for limiting the use of the "if you do not believe"
format are far from clear. The General Comment at MAI 33.0128 explains
the limited use of the "if you do not believe" method with an example in
which the plaintiff submits in the verdict director that "defendant could
have stopped or swerved and thereby have prevented the injury." This
submission allows the plaintiff to recover if the injury could have been
avoided by either stopping or swerving; the plaintiff need not show both. If
this instruction is conversed by stating, "Your verdict must be for defendant if you do not believe defendant could have avoided the injury by
stopping or swerving," the jury is likely to read the converse to mean that
defendant wins if the jury decides that the injury could have been avoided
by stopping but not by swerving. This would be incorrect because the
plaintiff's theory in submitting in the disjunctive is that he can prevail by
showing either. To be a correct statement of the law the converse must be
27. See Notes on Use, MAI No. 33.02; Converse Instructions-General Comment under the heading "Disjunctive Submissions," MAI No. 33.01; How To Use
This Book under the heading "Converse Instructions," MAI p. LII.
28. See Converse Instructions-General Comment under the heading "Disjunctive Submissions," MAI No. 33.01.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1977
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interpreted to state that "Your verdict must be for defendant if you do not
believe that the injury could have been avoided by swerving nor do you
believe that the injury could have been avoided by stopping."
If the "unless you believe" converse is used it will state that "Your
verdict must be for defendant unless you believe that the injury could have
been avoided by stopping or swerving." The more likely reading of this
instruction tells the jury that the plaintiff wins if either alternative is
applicable while the verdict would be for defendant only if neither stopping nor swerving would have been successful to avoid the injury.
Why does the "if you do not believe" format give an incorrect result
when combined with a disjunctive submission? A true converse instruction
is not an independent defense instruction in the sense that it does not set
forth a state of belief which the jury must reach before the defendant gets a
verdict. Quite the contrary, a true converse instruction embodies the defendant's right to try his case on the failure of the plaintiff to meet the
burden of proof with respect to one or more of the elements of his case. As
such, a true converse instruction simply points the jury's attention to some
aspect of the plaintiff's verdict director and on behalf of the defendant
says, "I win if you do not believe this part of plaintiff's verdict director."
The MAI rules for drafting converse instructions are fully consistent
with this characteristic of a true converse instruction. By requiring that the
instruction be drafted using the same connecting terms and the same
language as the verdict director, the converse instruction actually consists
of an introductory phrase followed by an incorporation of some or all of
the verdict director. The key to analyzing the converse instruction under
MAI is realizing that the converse instruction is designed to refer the
reader to the verdict director and that, in fact, the body of the converse
instruction is simply an extract from the verdict director.
Consider the following simplified instructions for purpose of analysis:
Verdict Director:
Converse:
your verdict must be for
your verdict must be for
plaintiff if you believe:
defendant if you do not believe:
(a), or
(a), or
(b)
(b)
This converse instruction is a verbal optical illusion. View it as an instruction which tells what the defendant must cause the jury to disbelieve if he is
to win. In this light, defendant wins if the jury disbelieves either (a) or (b).
Now change your perspective. Look at the converse instruction as an
incorporation of the verdict director. Viewed in this manner, it says defendant wins if plaintiff has not caused you to believe either of the elements
submitted in plaintiff's verdict director which are (a) or (b). The intended
interpretation is that defendant can win only if the jury lacks belief of both
propositions. In order for this interpretation to result, the converse instruction must strike the reader as the embodiment of the verdict director.
The trouble with the "if you do not believe" format is that it appears to
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol42/iss2/1
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be in the nature of an independent defense instruction. On the other hand,
the "unless you believe" format emphasizes the absence of belief rather
than a requisite state of disbelief. As such, it is more likely to strike the
reader as a direct reference to the verdict director because it says in effect
that "your verdict must be for defendant unless you believe (some or all of
the verdict director)." The MAI rules for converse instructions would have
to be designed differently if the converse instruction was to operate as an
independent defense rather than as a reference to the verdict director. For
one thing, in such event the converse instruction would have to use the
connecting term opposite that used in the verdict director. There is a direct
relationship between the problems under MAI relating to the selection of
the connecting term and the fact that the converse instruction is not always
perceived as a direct reference to the verdict director. It is not mere
accident that "if you do not believe" type instructions have been involved in
all of the situations where the court and the committee have deviated from
term in both the verdict director and the
using the same connecting
29
converse instruction.
The "if you do not believe" format has the same potential defect when
used to converse a conjunctive submission. If the plaintiff submits on
negligence and damages, a converse which says "Your verdict must be for
defendant if you do not believe negligence and damages" is incorrect if it is
read to say that "Your verdict must be for defendant only if you do not
believe negligence and if you do not believe damages." The defendant is
entitled to win if the jury does not believe one of the elements even if it
believes the other. This construction results from viewing the converse
instruction as setting forth propositions which, if disbelief is established,
will allow the defendant to prevail. On the other hand, the instruction is
accurate if it is perceived to say, Your verdict must be for defendant if you
do not believe all of the elements of plaintiff's verdict director which
includes negligence and damages." To the extent that the "if you do not
believe" format can be misconstrued when used to converse a conjunctive
submission, the misconstruction is detrimental to the defendant and would
not afford the plaintiff a basis for objection. This may account for the fact
that the MAI rules prohibit the "if you do not believe" format when
conversing disjunctive submissions while allowing it at the defendant's
option in the case of conjunctive submissions. In the long run, it would
probably be advisable to eliminate the "if you do not believe" format from
the MAI system. 0 It is doubtful that it offers any real advantage over the
more usable "unless you believe" instruction, and the system would probably be better off without the complexity which accompanies the "if you do
not believe" instruction. In the absence of this basic change in the system,
defendants would be well advised to avoid the use of the "if you do not
29. See text accompanying notes 24 through 26 supra.
30. At the very least, it is ironic that the limited use introductory phrase "if
you do not believe" is denominated in MAI as the "First Method" while the
universal "unless you believe" introductory phrase is relegated to the position of
"Second Method."
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believe" format except when conversing a single element from the plaintiffs verdict director. In conversing more than one element, the rule
prohibits the use of this method if the elements are submitted in the
disjunctive, and the potential adverse ambiguity against the defendant
should discourage its use when conversing elements submitted in the
conjunctive.
D. Modifying the Converse Instruction Where PlaintiffSubmits
Alternative Theories in Separate Verdict DirectingInstructions
In certain situations, the plaintiff will be entitled to submit alternative
theories of recovery which will require the use of more than one verdict
directing instruction. For example, it is not uncommon for a plaintiff to
assert both regular negligence 31 and humanitarian negligence 32 against a
defendant. Since these cannot be combined in a single verdict directing
instruction, the plaintiff will be entitled to two verdict directors. The
plaintiff's theory of recovery is that if he sustains his burden of proof on
either regular negligence or humanitarian negligence, he is entitled to
recover; he is not required to be successful under both to obtain a verdict.
If the defendant were allowed to converse the regular negligence
instruction by stating, "Your verdict must be for defendant unless you
believe (some or all of the regular negligence directing instruction)," this
instruction would be erroneous. The defendant is not necessarily entitled
to a verdict if the plaintiff fails on his regular negligence cause of action;
plaintiff may still obtain a verdict on his humanitarian theory of recovery.
In such a case, the converse instruction should be modified by changing the
word "verdict" to "finding" and by inserting in the introductory phrase of
the converse instruction a direct reference to the number of the verdict
director being conversed.3 3 Thus, the instruction conversing the regular
negligence verdict director will read, "Your finding must be for defendant
under Instruction Number - (insert the number of the regular negligence verdict director) unless you believe (some or all of the propositions
contained in the regular negligence verdict director)." In most situations,
the defendant will be entitled to an additional converse instruction conversing the verdict director which submitted humanitarian negligence. This
instruction will be modified in a similar manner except that the number of
the humanitarian verdict director is inserted in the introductory phrase,
and the instruction will incorporate some or all of the propositions contained in the humanitarian verdict directing instruction.
Other reoccurring situations in which alternative theories of recovery
are submitted in separate verdict directing instructions include: submis31. MAI No. 17.01 and 17.02.
32. MAI No. 17.14 and 17.15.

33. Converse Instructions--General Comment under the heading "Both
Primary and Humanitarian Negligence Submitted," MAI 33.01; Payton v. Bi-State
Development Agency, 417 S.W.2d 522 (St. L. Mo. App. 1967).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol42/iss2/1
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sions on regular negligence3 4 and negligence per se;35 submissions on
wrong side of the road3 1 or the rear-end doctrine,37 along with some
additional specifications of negligence; 38 and submissions against an employer based upon his independent negligence and upon his respondeat
superior liability for the acts of his employee.3 9 If a defendant is entitled to
more than one converse instruction in any of these situations, they must be
modified in the manner indicated above or reversible error will result.

E.

Determining How Much (or How Little) of the
Verdict Director to Converse

As a general rule, the defendant has the option to converse as much or
as little of the verdict director as desired. In drafting his converse instruction, he uses the appropriate introductory phrase for the converse instruction followed by all paragraphs of the verdict director, a single paragraph
of the verdict director or some combination of the various paragraphs of
the verdict director.
In terms of strategy, many trial lawyers try to use the converse instruction to highlight the single element or, in some instances, the two elements
where the plaintiff's evidence is weakest. For example, if the defendant
claims that the plaintiff is a malingerer it would be appropriate to converse
the damages paragraph of the verdict director. In a case where the injuries
are substantial but the liability is questionable, a defendant normally would
not choose to converse damages.
A converse of the complete verdict director could be used in a case
where the defendant wants to argue that the plaintiff has the burden of
proof on all of the elements of the verdict director and to suggest that
plaintiff may have failed on any one of those. However, many defense
counsel prefer in this situation to elect not to use a converse instruction and
to simply make this argument from the verdict director itself.
It is clear that the defendant may converse all or any lesser number of
the paragraphs of a verdict director which are submitted in the conjunctive.4 0 The rule is that you can converse any single conjunctive element,
and this rule is not altered by the fact that several conjunctive elements are
34. MAI No. 17.01 and 17.02.
35. MAI No. 17.17 and 17.18.
36. MAI No. 17.13 (Supp. 1976).
37. MAI No. 17.16 (Supp. 1976).
38. It is not clear to the writer, in view of the changes in the Wrong Side of the
Road instruction (MAI No. 17.13) and the Rear End Collision instruction (MAI No.
17.16) as required by the 1976 MAI Pocket Parts, whether these specifications can
be submitted in the disjunctive along with other specifications of negligence in a
single verdict director or whether separate verdict directing instructions are
required.
39. MAI No. 18.01.
40. How To Use This Book under the heading "Converse Instructions" at
MAI p. LI.
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contained in a single paragraph of a verdict director. For example, the
products liability verdict director 41 includes:
Second, the product, as manufactured, was defective and therefore dangerous when put to a use reasonably anticipated, and...
This single paragraph contains two elements: that the product is defective
and dangerous. In Lietz v. Snyder Mfg. Co. 4 2 the court approved a converse
instruction to the effect that "Your verdict must be for defendant unless
you believe the product, as manufactured, was defective."
In conversing disjunctive submissions, there is an important limitation
on defendant's right to converse whatever he desires. This limitation is that
if the defendant elects to converse any element of a disjunctive submission,
he is required to converse all elements of the disjunctive submission. 43 For
example, if the plaintiff submits that "defendant either failed to keep a
proper lookout or drove at an excessive speed," it would be error to use a
converse instruction merely stating that "Your verdict must be for defendant unless you believe defendant failed to keep a proper lookout." Such an
instruction deprives the plaintiff of the opportunity to obtain a verdict
based on the alleged excessive speed even though the evidence fails with
respect to the lookout specification. A proper converse of these disjunctive
submissions would state, "Your verdict must be for defendant unless you
believe defendant either failed to keep a proper lookout or drove at an
excessive speed." This rule does not require that the defendant always
converse the disjunctive submission. The requirement is that if he converses any element of the disjunctive submission, he must converse all such
disjunctive submissions. Defendant may elect to converse other submissions in the verdict director, and so long as he does not converse any of the
disjunctive specifications, he is free to converse as much or as little of the
remainder of the verdict director as he wishes.
The question of what must be conversed when conversing a verdict
director containing disjunctive submissions has been complicated and left
uncertain by the case of Davis v. St. Louis Southwestern RailroadCo.44 This is
a FELA case where plaintiff was injured while working on a railroad
handcar. The verdict director 45 was unique in that it submitted in a single
41. MAI No. 25.04.
42. 475 S.W.2d 105 (Mo. 1972).
43. Notes on Use, MAI No. 33.04.
44. 444 S.W.2d 485 (Mo. 1969). The author wishes to disclose that he has
previously been employed and has rendered an opinion to a law firm involved in
litigation now pending on appeal in which it is claimed that the Davis opinion is
significant.
45. Plaintiff's verdict director in Davis read as follows:
"Your verdict must be for the plaintiff if you believe:
"First, defendant failed to provide reasonably safe methods of work,
or
"Second, defendant's employee other than plaintiff dropped the
brake beam on the hammer handle, and
"Third, defendant in the respect submitted in paragraph First was
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol42/iss2/1
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verdict directing instruction for the negligence of two different persons
(the employer and the employee). Because of this, paragraph second of the
verdict director, which would normally submit the general standard of
negligence for a single person, submitted two general negligence standards
in the alternative-one for the employer and another for the employee.
The defendant elected to converse this second paragraph. To do so he
should have drafted a "Not in MAI" converse instruction by selecting the
appropriate introductory phrase and using the exact language from the
second paragraph of the plaintiff's verdict director. This would have
caused the converse to cover the general negligence standard for both
persons involved. Unfortunately, the defendant made the mistake of using
MAI No. 33.02(2) which states, "Your verdict must be for defendant if you
do not believe that defendant was negligent." This converse was clearly
erroneous because it conversed only the general negligence standard of the
employer and did not cover the general negligence standard of the employee. It deprived the plaintiff of the opportunity to win on the employee's negligence which was one of the alternative theories for recovery.
The case would cause no problem if the court had simply stated that
the converse instruction was a misdirection because of the unusual nature
of the verdict director and the failure of the defendant to incorporate in his
converse instruction the specific language of the portion of the verdict
director being conversed. Instead, the opinion attempted to base the decision on the cautionary note contained in the Notes on Use at MAI No.
33.02. This cautionary note states:
Caution. This form, using the introduction, "if you do not believe"
is not suitable for conversing multiple negligent acts submitted in
the disjunctive. For such converse instruction use the form similar
to Converse Instruction 33.04(5).
MAI No. 33.04(5) is an example of an "unless you believe" type instruction
conversing three disjunctive specifications of negligence. This cautionary
note was intended to prohibit the use of the "if you do not believe" type of
instruction in a situation where disjunctive submissions are being conversed. 46 The second sentence refers anyone who wishes to converse a
disjunctive submission to the "unless you believe" type of instruction contained in MAI 33.04. This cautionary note should not have been applied to
the converse instruction used in Davis because the defendant in Davis did
not attempt to converse the disjunctive specifications of negligence; he only
conversed the general negligence paragraph.
Unfortunately, the opinion in Davis interprets this cautionary note to
require any defendant who converses the general negligence paragraph of
negligent, or defendant's employee other than plaintiff in the respect
submitted in paragraph Second was negligent, and

"Fourth, such negligence directly resulted in whole or part in injury to

plaintiff."
46. See text accompanying notes 27 through 30 infra.
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a verdict director containing disjunctive specifications of negligence to also
converse all such disjunctive specifications of negligence. 4 It seems clear
that the court read into the cautionary note matters which were not intended to be included. MAI No. 33.04 contains five approved instructions
designed solely for conversing verdict directors containing disjunctive submissions. The bold letter heading for MAI 33.04 makes it clear that these
instructions are specifically provided for use in conversing verdict directors
contianing disjunctive submissions. 4 Two of those instructions [MAI No.
33.04(1) and 33.04(4)] converse the general negligence paragraph of a
disjunctive verdict director without conversing any of the disjunctive submissions. If the Davis opinion were to be applied literally, the use of both
these instructions would be reversible error.
The discussion in Davis concerning the necessity of conversing all
aspects of a disjunctive submission was not without merit in that case
because the general negligence paragraph in that verdict director in fact
contained a disjunctive submission. Likewise, the proposition that it was
inadequate to use a simple general negligence converse instruction in the
Davis case was certainly correct because the defendant in Davis was not
conversing a simple general negligence paragraph. Read in this light, the
opinion should be limited to the facts of that case. It should not be applied
to invalidate a converse instruction by a defendant who elects to converse
only the general negligence paragraph of a verdict director which also
contains disjunctive submissions of negligence.
The rule should be clarified to provide, as it did before Davis, that the
only time a defendant is required to converse more of the verdict director
than he might otherwise elect is in the situation where he elects to converse
some aspect of the disjunctive submission; having elected to converse some
of the disjunctive submission, he is required to converse all of the disjunctive submission. Absent a clarifying decision by the court or some change in
the Notes on Use to clear up the problem, anyone who elects to converse
the general negligence paragraph of a verdict director containing disjunctive submissions should also converse all of the disjunctive submissions. In
time, it is probable that some unwilling pioneer will clear away the debris
left by the wake of the Davis opinion.
F. Conversing an Erroneous Verdict Director
In Missouri, either party is allowed to raise objections to instructions
for the first time in the Motion for New Trial. 49 It is standard operating
procedure for counsel to quietly but confidently sandbag at trial on any
possible error in the opponent's instructions except in those situations
47. 444 S.W.2d at 489.
48. The bold letter heading to MAI No. 33.04 states "Five Instructions Conversing Verdict Directing 17.02 Using 'Unless You Believe' Introduction." Verdict
Directing 17.02 is the required MAI instruction for submitting multiple negligent
acts in the disjunctive.
49. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 70.02.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol42/iss2/1
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where the suspected error in the opponent's instruction is so significant
that its impact on the jury will outweigh the advantage of having built-in
error in the case as insurance for a new trial. If the error is in the plaintiff's
verdict director, the defendant may be concerned about using the same
language in his converse instruction, fearing that on appeal the plaintiff
will contend that the use of the same language in the converse instruction

somehow cures the error in the verdict director. The defendant's concern
should be shortlived. Rule 7 0 .0 1 (f)50 provides, in part that "[t]he request of
a converse instruction shall not be deemed to waive any objection to the
instruction conversed."
The only holding which has even hinted at any inroad into this rule is
Fowler v. Laclede Gas Company51 where the failure to define a term in the
verdict director was deemed to be cured by the failure to define the same
term in the converse instruction. The rationale that two wrongs make a
right is questionable; in any event the case does not really cast doubt on the
defendant's right to converse a portion of the verdict director and then
later object to the very language conversed.
A slightly different problem arises when the defendant who objects to
a portion of the verdict director as being a misstatement of the law, is
overruled by the trial court. If the defendant is firm in his belief that the
instruction is incorrect, he may want to converse in language which he
believes to be a correct statement of the law even though it is different from
the language of the verdict director. Having raised the objection, the
defendant's strategy no longer involves any hesitance to disclose to opposing counsel and the court his belief that the verdict director is wrong.
In Smile v. Lawson,52 a medical malpractice case, the plaintiff submitted on defendant's failure to protect the laryngeal nerves during
surgery. The defendant's instruction stated, "Your verdict must be for
defendant .. .unless you believe that defendant severed plaintiff's . ..
laryngeal nerves and that defendant had actual knowledge of this fact and
fraudulently concealed this fact from plaintiff and engaged in trickery and
deceit to prevent plaintiff from ascertaining the truth of her condition. . .. -53 The verdict was for defendant; the plaintiff appealed on
defendant's instruction. The court affirmed stating that the defendant's
instruction was the correct statement of the law while the plaintiff's instruction was too favorable to the plaintiff. The result would seem to be authority for the proposition that a defendant, who is convinced that the verdict
director is wrong, can submit his version of the law to the jury in his "unless
you believe" instruction. If it turns out that the plaintiff is wrong on the law
and the defendant is right, the defendant will not be reversed. It follows,
50. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 70.01(f).
51. 488 S.W.2d 934 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1972).
52. 506 S.W.2d 400 (Mo. 1974).
53. Id. at 402. It is interesting that although the defendant's instruction uses
the introductory phrase "unless you believe" the court referred to it throughout the
opinion as an affirmative defense instruction.
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however, that if the court on appeal decides that both the plaintiff's and the
defendant's intructions are correct, even though expressed in different
language, the defendant will probably lose his verdict because he will have
violated the rule requiring the converse instruction to track the language of
the verdict director. It would seem that defendant should submit his own
version of the law in his converse instruction only in those situations where
the difference in the instructions will have a significant impact on the jury
and the defendant is confident that he is right on the law and the plaintiff is
wrong.
IV.

How

MANY CONVERSE INSTRUCTIONS ARE

Too

MANY?

Since converse instructions are in a sense "excess baggage" in that they
are not essential to a complete logical presentation of the case to the jury,
the question arises as to how many such instructions the defendant is
entitled to add to the bundle. On the one hand, the defendant has the
option to refuse to use any converse instructions. On the other hand, the
logic of the instructions would not be disrupted if the defendant were
allowed to use numerous converse instructions since the only function of
the converse instruction is emphasis. Allowing the defendant several converse instructions would merely allow him additional opportunity to
emphasize.
Since converse instructions are only an accessory, it is reasonable that
there should be some limitation on the number of such instructions the
defendant can add to the instruction package. The main argument for
having converse instructions is to give the defendant an instruction which
parallels the plaintiff's verdict director by stating, "Your verdict must be for
the defendant if. . .

."

Thus, it is not surprising that the number of

converse instructions a defendant may use in a case is directly related to the
number of verdict directors in the case.
The original committee rule was a simple mechanical one which allowed one converse instruction for each verdict director. 54 It is unlikely
that either the committee or the court ever expected that this simple
concept would grow to be one of the most complex problem areas in the
MAI system.55 One of the reasons that it has become so complex is because
in multiple-party litigation the limitation on the allowable number of converse instructions is not dependent upon the number of plaintiffs or
defendants; the limitation is based solely on the number and the nature of
the verdict directing instructions. Thus, it is common that multiple defendants will be required to agree upon and join together in a single converse
54. See the last sentence of the Notes on Use, MAI No. 33.02, 33.03 and 33.04
in the permanent portion of MAI. This has since been modified in the 1976 pocket
parts to MAI.
55. See BICKEL, Jury Instructions-A New Limitation On Conversing Verdict
Directors, 37 Mo. L. REV. 335 (1972) for a chronological discussion of the cases as

they had developed to that point.
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instruction in order to be within the allowable limitation on the number of
converse instructions.
The rules in this area can be summarized as follows:
1. You can never have more converse instructions in the case
than verdict directors.
2. If two or more verdict directors submit common theories of
recovery, you may never have more than one converse instruc56
tion directed to any such common theory of recovery.
3. If two verdict directing instructions submit common theories
of recovery and one of those instructions contains an additional element, then an additional converse5 7instruction is allowable to converse the additional element.
The first rule represents all that is left of the original simple mechanical rule which allowed one converse instruction for each verdict director. It
is important to note that the first rule is worded in the negative; it states
that if you have more converse instructions than you have verdict directors,
you have too many. The rule does not mean that you can always have one
converse instruction for each verdict director, and, in fact, there are many
situations in which one converse instruction for each verdict director will be
too many. Thus, the first rule is only an upper limit; it does not represent a
safe harbor within which to operate. Even if you have only one converse
instruction for each verdict director in the case, you may still be in violation
of the second rule.
The second rule further limits the number of converse instructions to
a single converse instruction for any theory of recovery, even though that
theory of recovery may be submitted in several verdict directing instructions. One of the problems in applying this second rule is in understanding
what is meant by a "common theory of recovery." This phrase does not
mean what it sounds like it means because it does not ordinarily involve the
complete theory upon which the plaintiff relies for his recovery against a
defendant. If two verdict directing instructions have identical paragraphs
submitting the same factual element, the element is a "common theory of
recovery." Only one converse instruction may be directed to such factual
issue regardless of how many parties may have submitted or been submitted against on such element.
For example, if a plaintiff sues an employee and his employer based on
the employee's negligence, two verdict directing instructions will be required. These instructions will be identical except that the verdict director
against the employer will contain an additional paragraph submitting scope
of employment. The paragraphs in both verdict directors containing the
specifications of negligence, the general negligence standard, causation,
and damages will be identical because each will involve the conduct of the
employee on the occasion in question. All of these identical paragraphs are
56. See Notes on Use, MAI No. 33.02, 33.03 and 33.04 (Supp. 1976).
57. Id.
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common theories of recovery, and only one converse instruction may be
directed to such common theories.5 8 The defendants, even though they
may be represented by separate cousel, will be required to agree upon a
joint converse instruction which will begin, "Your verdict must be for both
defendants unless you believe (followed by the common theories of recovery which the defendants mutually decide to converse)."
If the employer desires to converse the specifications of negligence
and damages while the employee wants to converse only damages, an
impasse is met. If they attempt to accomplish their separate goals by using a
joint converse instruction conversing damages with the employer using an
additional converse instruction conversing the specifications of negligence,
the employer will have too many converse instructions. He will have two
converse instructions directed to the single verdict director against him. If
a disagreement arises because the employee wishes to converse damages
while the employer chooses to try the case with no converse instruction, the
fact that only the employee submits a converse instruction should not be
reversible error. However, it is illogical, and it could be detrimental to the
employer because the only converse instruction in the case says, "Your
verdict must be for the defendant employee unless you believe that plaintiff sustained damages" without mentioning that in such event the jury's
verdict must also be for the employer. Thus, as a practical matter it
becomes important in such a case for the defendants to agree upon their
converse instruction strategy.
The third rule actually works in conjunction with the second rule in
most cases involving common theories of recovery. Thus in the litigation
described above against the employee and employer, the employer will be
allowed to converse scope of employment in a separate converse instruction in addition to submitting the joint converse with his employee. This is
allowed because scope of employment is an additional element contained in
the verdict director against the employer which is not contained in the
verdict director against the employee.
Two types of cases involving two plaintiffs and one defendant have
caused similar problems. When a minor is injured, it is common for the
minor to sue for his personal injuries and for his father to join in the suit to
recover the medical expenses. In such a case, separate verdict directors are
required since there must be a finding that the particular plaintiff was
damaged before that plaintiff can recover. Each verdict director will contain identical language except that in paragraph third relating to damages,
the minor's verdict director will submit that he was damaged while the
father's verdict director will submit that the minor was injured and the
father thereby sustained damage. 59 Although both damage paragraphs use
similar language, they refer to the damages of different persons. The
58. Scheele v. American Bakeries Co., 427 S.W.2d 361 (Mo. 1968).
59. MAI No. 31.04.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol42/iss2/1
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paragraphs of the verdict directors containing specifications of negligence,
the general negligence standard, and causation are "common theories of
recovery." If defendant chooses to converse any or all of these, he must do
60
so with one converse instruction directed to both verdict directors.
It is not as clear how a defendant who wishes to converse damages
should proceed. Certainly it would be error to use one converse instruction
which stated "Your verdict must be for defendant unless you believe both
plaintiffs sustained damage" because if the minor sustained damage, he is
entitled to recover e'en though his father was not damaged. The only
alternative is to use two converse instructions one of which would state that
"Your verdict must be for defendant against plaintiff minor unless you
believe plaintiff minor sustained damage." The other converse would be
similar but would substitute "plaintiff father" for "plaintiff minor."
If a defendant decides to converse both damages and some other
portion of the verdict director, he is certain to be flirting with error. If he
uses two separate converse instructions for damages each of which also
contains the converse of the other portion, he will have two converse
instructions directed to the portions of the verdict director which are
"common theories of recovery." If he uses separate converse instructions
for the damage portions and then a third joint converse instruction against
the "common theories of recovery," he will have two converse instructions
directed to each verdict director and this is almost sure to be error. Until
the rules are refined to cover this problem, the defendant will be well
advised to choose between conversing damages or conversing the "common theories of recovery." There is just too much risk in trying to converse
both.
Even if the defendant chooses to converse only damages and thus to
use two separate but similar converse instructions, the question may be
asked as to whether he is using two converse instructions against a "common theory of recovery." It may be argued that the damage paragraphs are
common theories of recovery simply because they contain some identical
language. However, where the identical language refers to the conduct or
status of different persons it should not constitute a common theory of
recovery.
In Demko v. H & H Investment Co.6 1 the plaintiff sued for personal
injuries sustained in a fall in a parking lot of a restuarant and motel. There
were five defendants. The three separate verdict directors against three of
the defendants (the lessee of the motel and the lessee and sub-lessee of the
restaurant) were similar in that one asserted negligence for "failure to use
ordinary care" to make the parking lot reasonably safe and the other two
asserted negligence for "failure to use ordinary care in failing either to
remove or warn of ice and snow." Each of the three defendants in question
60. Watterson v. Portas, 466 S.W.2d 129 (St. L. Mo. App. 1971); accord,
Murphy v. Land, 420 S.W.2d 505 (Mo. 1967).
61. 527 S.W.2d 382 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1975).
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gave a separate identical converse instruction stating, "Your verdict must
8 2
be for [this defendant] unless you believe [this defendant] was negligent. 6
The separate verdict directors were required because, although identical
language was used, each verdict director referrred to the negligence of a
different party. The defendants used separate converse instructions for
the same reason. It was argued on appeal that all three defendants should
have joined in one converse instruction because the three negligence
paragraphs used the same language and were therefore "identical theories
of recovery."
In the original opinion issued by the St. Louis Court of Appeals, the
court held that the use of three converse instructions was error; but on its
own motion the court withdrew the first opinion and thereafter issued a
second opinion holding that the verdict directors did not constitute "common theories of recovery" since the plaintiff had asserted a separate and
distinct theory against each defendant. The court stated, "where a plaintiff
asserts a separate theory of liability against multiple defendants where
there is no derivative liability existing among the defendants, and plaintiff
submits a separate verdict instruction as to each defendant, then each
defendant may submit a separate converse instruction. 6' 3 Demko should
make it clear that several verdict directors containing similar language but
referring to the conduct or damages of different persons are not "common
theories of recovery."
The other type of case involving two plaintiffs and one defendant in
which it is troublesome to draft a converse instruction is a personal injury
case involving loss of consortium. The plaintiffs (injured party and spouse)
must use separate verdict directing instructions. 64 The spouse's verdict
director submits in the damage paragraph that "as a direct result of such
negligence plaintiff (injured party) was injured and as a direct result of
such injury plaintiff (spouse) sustained damage." The other verdict director merely submits that "as a direct result of such negligence plaintiff
(injured party) was damaged." The other portions of both verdict directors
are identical and constitute "common theories of recovery."65 As such, the
defendant is limited to one converse instruction against those portions of
the verdict directors.
With respect to the damage paragraphs, it is not altogether clear
whether the portion of the spouse's verdict director submitting the injured
62. On plaintiff's alternative argument, the court held that the failure of the
defendants to use the same language in the converse instructions as was used in the
verdict director was not reversible error in view of the fact that the term "negligence" in the converse instruction was defined as the failure to use ordinary care
which was the term used in the verdict director.
63. 527 S.W.2d at 388.

64. See MAI No. 33.05 and 33.06 which are illustrations of instructions in
cases involving loss of consortium.
65. Scheele v. American Bakeries Co., 427 S.W.2d 361 (Mo. 1968); Wyatt v.
Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 514 S.W.2d 366 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1974);
Joggerst v. O'Toole, 513 S.W.2d 722 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1974).
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party's injury and the portion of the injured party's verdict director submitting his damage are common theories of recovery. It is obvious that they
66
refer to the same element but in different language. The Notes on Use
which establish the rules on the allowable number of converse instructions,
use the wife's claim in a consortium case as an example of the third rule
where an additional instruction is allowed to converse an extra element
which is submitted in one verdict director but not in the other.
There is almost no limit to the diverse ways in which defendants have
erred in conversing in consortium cases. The defendant has too many
converse instructions if he uses identical converse instructions to converse
68
67
identical portions of the verdict directors or if he uses two general
converse instructions. 69 If the defendant uses one converse instruction to
converse damages in both verdict directors, this is a misdirection because it
allows the defendant to prevail unless both plaintiffs are damaged. 70 In
Scheele v. American Bakeries Co.7' where husband and wife sued two defendants (employer and employee with scope of employment not in issue), the
defendants probably set a record by using four identical converse instructions when they were only entitled to one.
The idea that there should be a limit on the allowable number of
converse instructions is certainly justified. In the beginning the limit was
expressed in terms of a simple one-for-one mechanical test. Through the
case law, this limit has evolved into a very complex and technical rule which
defies succinct expression and which is extremely difficult to apply. The
whole matter and method of limiting the number of converse instructions
should be re-examined. It would appear that the harm in allowing some
duplication in converse instructions would be more than outweighed by the
benefits of a simple rule which would allow each defendant to submit one
separate converse instruction for each verdict director submitted against
him. If this be true, then the committee and the court should consider a
return to this approach to the problem.
V.

USE OF THE GENERAL CONVERSE

MAI No. 33.13 contains a general converse instruction as follows:
Your verdict must be for defendant (unless you believe) (if you do
not believe) each proposition submitted to you in Instruction No.
-(here
insert number of plaintiff's verdict directing instruction).
On first glance, this instruction may appear to be the answer to a defend66. Notes on Use, MAI No. 33.02, 33.03 and 33.04 (Supp. 1976).
67. Joggerst v. O'Toole, 513 S.W.2d 722 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1974).
68. MAI No. 33.13.
69. Wyatt v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 514 S.W.2d 366 (Mo. App., D.
Spr. 1974).
70. Burrow v. Moyer, 519 S.W.2d 568 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1975).
71. 427 S.W.2d 361 (Mo. 1968).
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ant's prayer for a safe and easy path through the converse instruction
jungle. But looks are deceiving. It has been suggested that this page of the
book should be bordered in black to commemorate the many defendants
who have ridden it to reversible error.
First, the Notes on Use 7 2 for this instruction provide that it is not
appropriate where the plaintiff has submitted on alternate theories of
recovery. If plaintiff submits on excessive speed or failure to keep a careful
lookout, it is error to use the general converse which says, "Your verdict
must be for defendant unless you believe each proposition submitted." The
theory of plaintiff's disjunctive submission is that he can win on either
lookout or speed; he is not required to prove both. It should be obvious
that the general converse instruction is not appropriate in such a case.
However, consider an instruction such as MAI No. 22.03, the verdict
director used when an invitee sues a landowner. On its face, it does not
appear to contain a disjunctive submission because each paragraph is
connected with the conjunctive "and". Look closely, however, at paragraph
third. It states, "defendant knew or by using ordinary care could have
known of this condition, and. . . ." There is a disjunctive submission
within this single paragraph. The plaintiff is not required to prove both
that defendant had actual knowledge and that he should have known;
plaintiff is entitled to recover if he establishes either. The use of the general
converse against this verdict director, even though all separate paragraphs
are submitted in the conjunctive, is likely to be error. Surprisingly, there
are several reported cases involving this type of verdict director where a
general converse was used, but apparently no plaintiff has argued that the
73
general converse is error for this reason in this situation.
A further problem arises in the use of the general converse instruction
where plaintiff submits on alternative theories in separate verdict directing
instructions. The Notes on Use 74 state, "In those very rare cases where
plaintiff submits two verdict directing instructions (e.g., humanitarian and
primary negligence) the numbers of both verdict directing instructions
would be inserted." This would mean that in a case where Instruction
Number 3 is the primary negligence verdict director and Instruction
72. Notes on Use, MAI No. 33.13.
73. Mayberry v. Clarkson Construction Co., 482 S.W.2d 721 (Mo. 1972),
reversed on other grounds, where the verdict director contained not only actual or
constructive knowledge but also submitted failure to warn or barricade; Wyatt v.
Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 514 S.W.2d 366 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1974),
reversed on other grounds, where plaintiff submitted actual or constructive knowledge but the use of the general converse instruction was apparently not questioned
because of the disjunctive submission; Fehlbaum v. Newhouse Broadcasting Corp.,
483 S.W.2d 664 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1972) where plaintiff argued unsuccessfully
that it was error to have both an affirmative defense and a converse instruction but
apparently did not argue that it was error to use the general converse instruction to
converse a verdict director which submitted either actual or constructive
knowledge.
74. Notes on Use, MAI No. 33.13.
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Number 5 is the humanitarian negligence verdict director, the converse
would state, "Your verdict must be for defendant unless you believe each
proposition submitted in Instruction Number 3 (and vs. or) Number 5."
The Notes on Use do not specify whether to use the two numbers conjunctively or disjunctively.
In Maybery v. Clarkson Construction Co.,75 the defendant used "and".
This was, of course, error because this tells the jury that the defendant wins
unless the jury believes all propositions in both the primary and the
humanitarian submissions. Since these are alternative theories, plaintiff in
fact prevails if the jury believes all propositions in either the primary or the
humanitarian submissions. Using "or", so that the converse says "Your
verdict must be for defendant unless you believe each proposition submitted in Instruction Number 3 or Number 5," is better as far as this
problem is concerned. However, it overlooks the fact that the humanitarian
negligence verdict director 76 cannot be conversed with the general converse instruction because it submits that "defendant knew or by using the
highest degree of care could have known" and that "at the moment when
defendant first knew or could have known of such position of immediate
danger. . . ." In Mayberry the court said that the general converse "obviously cannot be adapted or modified so as to be used where there are
multiple claims by multiple plaintiffs. 7 7 Until the Notes on Use for the
geieral converse instruction are re-examined, defendants are best advised
to avoid use of the general converse where there are alternative theories
submitted in separate verdict directors.
As has already been pointed out, in multiple party litigation the general converse instruction involves a high risk of error because of the possibility of having several verdict directors containing some paragraphs which
are common theories of recovery. Using the general converse instruction to
converse similar verdict directors will result in error no matter how many
converse instructions are used. If two such instructions are used, common
theories of recovery will be conversed too many times.78 If only one such
instruction is used, a misdirection will result because the instruction will
state that the defendant prevails against both plaintiffs unless both plaintiffs are damaged when, in fact, either plaintiff is entitled to a verdict if that
particular plaintiff shows damage. 79 The problem is that the general converse converses everything in the verdict director. Only in the most simple
situations may all elements of both verdict directors be safely conversed in
the same manner.
When you consider that the general converse instruction cannot be
used against any verdict director which contains even a single disjunctive
75. 482 S.W.2d 721 (Mo. 1972).
76. MAI No. 17.14 and 17.15.
77. 482 S.W.2d at 726.
78. Wyatt v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 514 S.W.2d 366 (Mo. App., D.
Spr. 1974).
79. Id.
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submission, that it will seldom be appropriate in multiple party litigation

and that even the Notes on Use contain error as to its use where alternative
theories are submitted in separate verdict directors, the one thing that
becomes clear is that this instruction must be reserved for only the simplest
litigation and must be used with exceedingly great care. Its simple and easy
appearance is indeed a trap for the unwary.
VI.

THE AFFIRMATIVE CONVERSE INSTRUCTION

MAI No. 33.05, often referred to as the affirmative converse instruction,80 provides for a type of converse instruction which differs from any of
the others. It allows the defendant in an appropriate case to affirmatively
propose an ultimate issue which, if true, will defeat the plaintiff's right to
recover. This type of converse instruction takes the following form:
Your verdict must be for defendant if you believe (an ultimate
issue which, if true, will defeat the plaintiff's right to recover).
The use of this instruction can best be illustrated with one of the
leading cases which approved its use. In Wilson v. Checker Cab Co.81 the
plaintiff, a passenger in a taxicab, sought to recover for injuries sustained
when she fell while allegedly alighting from the taxicab. She submitted
against the cab company on alternative specifications of negligence that the
driver either stopped so that plaintiff stepped out onto a patch of ice or
started the cab before she had fully alighted. The defendant's theory of the
case was that the plaintiff safely emerged from the cab, walked 20 feet from
the taxi beyond a safety chain across a fire lane and then fell either by
reason of ice or because she was intoxicated. The court approved an
affirmative converse instruction used by the defendant which stated, "Your
verdict must be for the defendant if you believe plaintiff fell after she had
alighted from the defendant's taxicab and traveled approximately twenty
feet from said taxicab."
This type of converse instruction also has been approved where the
defense to an action for money had and received was that the money which
plaintiff claimed was paid to defendant's agent was really paid to the agent
in his individual capacity 82 and in a motor vehicle negligence action for
personal injuries where defendant submitted the absence of causation with
this type of converse instruction. 3 In Cline v. Carthage Crushed Limestone
Co.,84 a common law negligence action, defendant relied on the affirmative
defense that plaintiff, although an independent contractor, was perform-

ing work on defendant's premises which was within the usual business of
80. The Affirmative Converse instruction is also referred to as the "Third
Method" converse instruction. MAI 33.01, p. 351.
81. 431 S.W.2d 122 (Mo. 1968).
82. Restaurant Industries, Inc. v. Lum's, Inc. 495 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. App., D.
St. L. 1973).

83. Sheets v. Dakota Iron Store, 442 S.W.2d 953 (K.C. Mo. App. 1969).
84. 504 S.W.2d 102 (Mo. 1973).
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the defendant and therefore plaintiff's sole remedy was under the Workmen's Compensation Law. 8 5 The court approved plaintiff's use of the
affirmative converse instruction to set forth that he was an independent
contractor repairing an improvement on defendant's premises, which is a
statutory exception 86 to the defendant's affirmative defense.
Although the affirmative converse instruction has been approved in
the foregoing situations,8 7 there have been numerous cases in which its use
has resulted in reversible error. Seasoned users of MAI would agree that
the affirmative converse can lay an equal claim with that of the general
converse 8 in regard to high risk of error lurking beneath a mask of
apparent simplicity.
By using the affirmative converse, the defendant assumes the burden
of proof on the proposition relied upon as a defense.8 9 This is inherent in
the introductory phrase "if you believe" and is the opposite approach from
the true converse instruction which begins with the phrase "unless you
believe" or "if you do not believe." The whole thrust of the affirmative
converse instruction is contrary to that of a true converse instruction
because this instruction does not rely upon the absence of proof of the
propositions submitted in the verdict director. By definition this instruction posits an independent state of facts which, if true, will defeat the
plaintiff's claim. In reality, it is more like an affirmative defense instruction
than a true converse instruction.
The most critical aspect of having taken the burden of proof by the use
of this instruction is that the proposition submitted must be supported by
independent evidence. Unlike the true converse instruction which requires
no evidence and which is proper based merely on the defendant's contention that the plaintiff's evidence was insufficient, it is reversible error for a
defendant to use an affirmative converse instruction which is not supported by the evidence.90 Even though this converse instruction resembles
85. § 287.040(1), RSMo 1959.
86. § 287.040(3), RSMo 1959.
87. See Williams v. Christian, 520 S.W.2d 139 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1974) where
plaintiff, who was hit by an automobile while standing on the shoulder of the
highway, claimed that she was improperly refused a regular lookout instruction
(MAI No. 17.05) and defendant claimed that the lookout instruction was properly
refused because it did not hypothosize defendant's version of the facts that plaintiff
was standing in the traveled portion of the highway. The court said that the proper
way to submit defendant's version of the accident was with an affirmative converse
instruction, and, therefore, the regular lookout instruction requested by plaintiff
should have been given. See'also Vondras v. Titanium Research & Development
Co., 511 S.W.2d 883 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1974) where the use of the affirmative
converse instruction was not questioned on appeal.
88. See text accompanying notes 72 through 79 supra.
89. Koirtyohann v. Washington Plumbing & Heating Co., 471 S.W.2d 217
(Mo. 1971); Wilson v. Checker Cab Co., 431 S.W.2d 122 (Mo. 1968); Bishop v.
Goldschmidt, 436 S.W.2d 47 (St. L. Mo. App. 1968).
90. Koirtyohann v. Washington Plumbing & Heating Co., 471 S.W.2d 217
(Mo. 1971); Bishop v. Goldschmidt, 436 S.W.2d 47 (St. L. Mo. App. 1968).
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an affirmative defense, it does not require an affirmative defense type
insertion 91 in MAI No. 3.01, the Burden of Proof instruction, 92 and it does
not require an affirmative defense tail93 on the verdict
director to refer the
94
jury directly to the affirmative converse instruction.
It goes without saying that the facts hypothesized in the affirmative
converse instruction must be sufficient in law to defeat the plaintiff's claim.
In Shepard v. Ford Motor Co. 95 the plaintiff sought damages in a products
liability case contending that the springs on a log trailer separated from its
axle when a U-bolt came loose which caused the brakes to fail and caused
the truck to collide with plaintiff's car. The defendant claimed that nothing
was wrong with the truck until the impact with plaintiff's car which broke
the U-bolt. The defendant used an affirmative converse stating, "Your
verdict must be for defendant if you believe the U-bolt broke at impact."
This instruction was erroneous because the plaintiff was nevertheless entitled to recover if the accident occurred because the axle slipped, even
though the U-bolt did not break until impact. Thus, the proposition submitted (that the U-bolt broke on impact) did not necessarily defeat plaintiff's claim.
In Moranz v. Schiller,9 6 an alienation of affections case, the defendant's
converse stated, "'Your verdict must be for defendant if you believe that
plaintiff and not defendant was the cause of the wife withdrawing her
affections." This was error because the fact that the defendant did not
cause the withdrawal of affection is not a defense to alienation of affections; this fact goes only to the mitigation of damages. Put another way, it is
a tort to successfully seek the affection of a wife who has no affection for
her husband.
Prior to the adoption of the MAI system, Missouri courts used an
instruction known as a "sole cause" instruction. Such an instruction in
effect said, "Your verdict must be for defendant if you believe (some
named third party) was the sole cause of the occurrence." Such an instruction is accurate because it is the logical consequence of the plaintiff's
affirmative obligation to show that the occurrence was the direct result of
the defendant's conduct. One of the basic premises of MAI is to submit
only the affirmative elements of the plaintiff's case and to avoid the duplication and confusion which is involved in also submitting other propositions which are merely inconsistent with the propositions the plaintiff must
prove. Thus, MAI No. 1.03 prohibits the use of a sole cause instruction.97
91. Notes on Use, para. 1, MAI No. 3.01.
92. Restaurant Industries, Inc. v Lum's, Inc., 495 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. App., D.
St. L. 1973).
93. MAI No. 17.01 and 17.02 (bracketed phrase at the end of each
instruction).
94. Bollman v. Kark Rendering Plant, 418 S.W.2d 39 (Mo. 1967).
95. 457 S.W.2d 255 (St. L. Mo. App. 1970).
96. 525 S.W.2d 785 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1975).
97. 1963 Report To Missouri Supreme Court under the heading "2. Sole
Cause Instructions," MAI p. XXVII.
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However, many affirmative converse instructions, which are authorized by
MAI No. 33.05, run a high risk of being sole cause instruction.
The example of the "if you believe" affirmative converse instruction at
MAI No. 33.05 states, "Your verdict must be for defendant if you believe
that plaintiff was not injured as a result of the collision mentioned in the
evidence." In Sheets v. Dakota Iron Store98 the use of this instruction was
attacked where the defendant alleged that the plaintiff's claimed injuries
were not sustained in the accident in question. The court upheld the use of
the instruction primarily on the ground that it was taken directly from MAI
and rejected plaintiff's argument that the instruction should have used the
term "direct result". It apparently was not argued that this was a sole cause
instruction although it seems that any distinction between this instruction
and a sole cause instruction is probably a distinction without a difference.
99
the plaintiff, who was injured in a gas
In Gathright v. Pendegraft
explosion, sued the city, a contractor and a plumber for leaving a gas stove
connection unplugged. The court rejected as a sole cause instruction a
requested instruction by the plumber to the effect that "Your verdict must
be for the defendant plumber if you believe that someone other than the
defendant plumber tampered with the stove connection after the defendant plumber worked on it." Although not labeled as such, the requested
instruction was essentially an affirmative converse instruction as well as a
sole cause instruction.
Apparently the court has not been called upon to face up to the
question of whether there is really any distinction between an affirmative
converse instruction and a sole cause instruction. Until clearer guidelines
are provided, defendants should carefully evaluate the likelihood that any
affirmative converse instruction they consider using may turn out to be a
prohibited sole cause instruction. By the same token, plaintiffs who face an
affirmative converse instruction can submit most such cases with the reassuring thought that if the jury does not reward their efforts, they will
probably have a credible argument on appeal that the affirmative converse
instruction violated the prohibition of MAI No. 1.03 against sole cause
instructions.
There is authority that it is error to use the affirmative converse
instruction to submit the same issue that is submitted in plaintiff's verdict
director on the theory that this can only be done with a true converse
instruction. In Stover v. Patrick' plaintiff submitted against defendant for
driving on the wrong side of the road. 10 1 Defendant used an affirmative
converse which stated, "Your verdict must be for defendant if you believe
98. 442 S.W.2d 953 (K.C. Mo. App. 1969).
99. 433 S.W.2d 299 (Mo. 1968).
100. 459 S.W.2d 393 (Mo. En Banc 1970).
101. MAI No. 17.13. This instruction has since been superceded by MAI No.
17.13 (Supp. 1976) which states, "Defendant's automobile was on the wrong side of
the road at the time of the collision."
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that defendant's motor vehicle skidded from its proper lane of travel onto
the wrong side of the road." The court first held that the converse instruction was error because it did not limit its application to non-negligent
skidding. This holding was sufficient to dispose of the case, but because it
was to be retried, the court expressly considered the further question of
whether any affirmative converse instruction would be proper to raise this
issue. The only thing being submitted in the affirmative converse was
whether the skid was negligent, and negligence of the defendant in being
on the wrong side of the road was submitted specifically in the general
10 2
negligence paragraph of the verdict director. Referring to another case
where an affirmative converse instruction was properly used, the court
said:
That is not comparable to an instruction submitting only the
question of whether movement of defendant's car into the wrong
lane was the result of non-negligent skidding (which is what a
modified [affirmative converse in this case] would do). It merely
converses, but in different language, the very same issue submitted in the verdict directing instruction of whether the driving
of the automobile into the wrong lane was negligent. Under MAI
33.01, this can be done only by a true converse instruction. Hence, to
meet the issue presented by [the verdict' director] the proper
course would be to submit a true or exact converse under MAI
33.02.103
In Oliver v. Bi-State Development Agency' 4 a six-year-old bus passenger
was injured when the rear door of a bus closed on her and pulled her
under the bus as it started to move. Plaintiff submitted against the defendant for failure of the driver to keep a careful lookout or for failure to have
an inter-lock door device on the bus. The bus company claimed that the
plaintiff, who was riding on the bus with her grandmother, got off at the
wrong stop and was caught in the door when attempting to reboard the bus
as her grandmother called to her.
The defendant used an affirmative converse instruction stating in
substance that "Your verdict must be for defendant if you believe that the
girl got off the bus, then triled to get back on and at this time the driver was
keeping a careful lookout." 10 5 One of plaintiff's attacks on this instruction
102.
103.
104.
105.

Wilson v. Checker Cab. Co., 431 S.W.2d 122 (Mo. 1968).
459 S.W.2d at 396 (Emphasis added).
494 S.W.2d 49 (Mo. 1973).
The complete converse instruction in Oliver was as follows:
"Your verdict must be for Defendant if you believe:
"First, Plaintiff alighted from Defendant's bus and reached a position
of safety on the sidewalk adjacent thereto, and
"Second, Plaintiff thereafter attempted to reboard said bus through
its rear exit doors, and
"Third, the operator of said bus was then keeping a careful lookout
under the circumstances then and there existing and,
"Fourth, the rear exit doors of said bus were then reasonably suitable
and fit for their intended use."
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was that it involved the use of the affirmative converse instruction to
submit the same issues submitted in the verdict director. In holding that
the converse instruction was reversible error, the court stated:
MAI 33.05 is not to be used where, as here, there is not an
ultimate issue to submit which would defeat plaintiff's claim. It is
not to be used to submit as a converse. . . "the two ultimate issues
submitted by plaintiff" in substantially the same language as used
in plaintiff's verdict director; in such instance MAI 33.01 requires
the use of the first or second method, MAI 33.02, 33.03 or
33.04.106

Both these cases appear to be fairly strong holdings that the affirmative converse instruction cannot be used to submit the same issue as is
submitted in the verdict director. On the other hand, there are some
indications that such a use is not improper. The example of the affirmative
converse at MAI 33.01 submits causation which would surely be part of the
plaintiff's submission in his verdict director. This very instruction was
approved in Sheets v. Dakota Iron Store.10 7 The court observed:
The [Notes on Use to the affirmative converse instruction 0 s]
point out that because of the need for independent evidence to
support an affirmative converse and because of the shifting of the
burden of proof by the language "if you believe," [the affirmative
converse] would rarely be used to converse a specific issue
hypothesized by plaintiff. However, it should be pointed out that
in the use of [MAI
these notes do not give any hint of impropriety
10 9
33.05] if the defendant so chooses.
Other cases have disclosed the use of an affirmative converse to submit the
very issue submitted in the verdict director but the converse instructions
used in these cases were not attacked on this ground.11 0 While authority can
be marshalled on either side of the issue, it seems clear that a defendant is
inviting error if he uses an affirmative converse instruction to submit an
issue which is submitted in the verdict director.
When a defendant uses an affirmative converse instruction he assumes
the burden of proof, he must have evidence to support the proposition
submitted, he must be certain that the facts hypothesized are sufficient in
106. 494 S.W.2d at 52.
107. 442 S.W.2d 953 (K.C. Mo. App. 1969).
108. Notes on Use, MAI No. 33.05.
109. 442 S.W.2d at 955.
110. Koirtyohann v. Washington Plumbing & Heating Co., 471 S.W.2d 217
(Mo. 1971) where an affirmative converse instruction, which was used to converse
the very acts of negligence submitted in the verdict director, was reversed for lack
of evidence to support the submission. No mention of any problem in using the
affirmative converse to cover the same issues submitted in the verdict director was
made. In Vondras v. Titanium Research & Development Co., 511 S.W.2d 883 (Mo.
App. D. St. L. 1974), an affirmative converse instruction was used to converse
damages, but the converse instruction was not attacked on appeal because the
defendant was the appealing party.
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law to bar the plaintiffs recovery, he runs the risk that he is using a
prohibited "sole cause" instruction and he must be certain that he is not
merely resubmitting the same issue as that submitted in the verdict director. If these problems surrounding affirmative converse instructions are
not sufficient to cause the committee and the court to remove this type of
instruction from MAI, these problems should at least cause defendant's
counsel to take this instruction out of use except in the most unusual
situation, i.e., where the affirmative converse instruction will be of significant importance in presenting defendant's contention to the jury and its
use has been clearly approved. Certainly MAI No. 33.05 does not merit the
use that its simple and innocent appearance invites to one leafing frantically through the pages of MAI at the last moment trying to come up with an
acceptable converse instruction.
VII.

CONCLUSION

From the standpoint of defendants, there is one fail-safe method for
avoiding error in converse instructions-don't use theml If a defendant is
unwilling to forego completely the use of converse instructions, the following suggestions will greatly reduce the risk of reversible error:
I. Use the verdict director as the source of the language for the
true converse instruction.
2. Do not use the "if you do not believe" format; use the universally acceptable "unless you believe" introductory phrase in
the true converse instruction.
3. Do not use a converse instruction in a case where there is
more than one verdict director.
4. Do not use the general converse instruction.
5. Do not use the affirmative converse instruction.
From the standpoint of plaintiffs, it is hoped that they were not
required to read very far into this article before realizing that a complete
understanding of the use of converse instructions should not be reserved
for defense counsel. As long as MAI provides for converse instructions,
unwary defendants will continue to shower upon needy plaintiffs an
abundance of opportunity to obtain a second chance in front of the jury.
The important requisite for the plaintiff is to recogneze and raise the
appropriate contention in his Motion for New Trial. Not only does the
plaintiff's best chance for reversal often lie in the defendant's converse
instructions, but it may be that converse instructions are at least as vulnerable on appeal as has always been true with respect to the plaintiff's verdict
director. Unless the use of converse instructions is either avoided or substantially simplified, they may actually serve in the overall litigation picture
as a more useful devise for plaintiffs than for defendants.
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